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Admissibility of Other Offenses to Prove Intent in Sex Cases
In the past decade the legislatures of many states have found it
necessary to overhaul their criminal laws in an attempt to deal with
the social problem presented by an increasing number of sex crimes.'
Likewise, the courts have been compelled by the pressure of public
opinion to deal strictly with sex offenders, and where the categories
of crime which the state has set up are inadequate to meet modern needs,
the courts have been forced to expand their ancient doctrines and modify
orthodox rules of evidence. The case of McKenzie v. State2 illustrates
well the dangers inherent in using old tools for new problems, and
demonstrates the urgent need for legislative revision in this area of the
criminal law.
In the McKenzie case the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a ruling
of the Court of Appeals upon the question of the admissibility of a
subsequent offense to prove specific intent. McKenzie was tried and
convicted upon a charge of assault with intent to rape. While driving
through the streets of Birmingham the defendant saw the prosecutrix,
a fifteen year old girl, and offered to drive her home. She accepted,
and the defendant, instead of taking her home, on a pretext headed in
another direction. Once out of the city he parked his car and made
known his intention to have sexual intercourse with her. She refused,
and he threatened bodily harm. After making several physical advances
he abandoned his aim and returned the girl to the city. This scene
occurred on June 13th. On August 4th the defendant under similar
circumstances picked up a married woman. Only after this woman
showed him an unhealed scar from an operation which she said prevented
her from having intercourse, did he abandon his aim.3
The state chose to prosecute for the first offense.4 It offered in evi-
dence the testimony of the married woman concerning the subsequent
attack upon her to rebut the contention of the defendant that he did
not intend to forcibly ravish the prosecutrix. The trial court allowed
testimony of the subsequent offense in evidence but instructed the jury
1 Some states have passed laws aimed at criminal sexual psychopaths. For one
example, see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947), c. 38, §820. Other states do not treat sexual
offenses separately, but bring the more extreme cases under their habitual offender
statutes. 2 Minn. Stat., c. 617, §617.75 (1945). Over a period of years many states
have raised the age of consent in rape cases, thus making it illegal to have intercourse
with a girl under a certain age. See Penal Code of Calif. (1941), Title 15, c. 2, §645;
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947), c. 38, §490; 4 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., c. 42, §10-4021; 25 Mich.
Stat. Ann., c. 286a, §28.785; 2 Minn. Stat. (1945), c. 617, §617.01. Where the age of
consent has been raised, it is usually found that the severe rape penalties have been
modified.
2 33 So. (2d) 488 (Ala., 1947).
3 See infra note 33 for cases involving similar fact patterns.
4 See infra note 30.
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that they were to consider this evidence solely on the issue of intent.5
The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
6
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but there
were two dissenting opinions.7
This case raises questions concerning the application of certain ex-
ceptions to the Character Rule. American courts have never per-
mitted a defendant's character to be attacked in a criminal proceeding
unless he first puts it in issue.8 Thus evidence of other offenses tending
to show a general disposition to commit crime cannot be used to prove the
specific crime charged. Likewise, evidence of other similar offenses
cannot be used to show a disposition to commit a particular type of
crime. This type of evidence is not admissible because the state has
the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime charged, and if the state were allowed to bring in
proof of other offenses the attention of the jury would not be focussed
upon the elements necessary to make out the crime charged, but upon
the defendant's bad record. The prejudice to the accused in such cir-
cumstances cannot be underestimated. 9 Such evidence is also objection-
able because it requires the defendant to defend himself against crimes
with which he is not charged in the indictment,' 0 and tends to compli-
cate the issues for the jury.
Nevertheless, proof of other offenses has a legitimate probative value
in certain situations where the elements of a crime are peculiarly diffi-
cult or impossible of proof without such evidence. The situations where
this has been found to be true are fairly well-defined, and have resulted
in certain well-known exceptions to the Character Rule." Evidence of
other similar offenses has been allowed for the purpose of proving
5 But see People v. Deal, 357 Ill. 634, 192 N.E. 649 (1934) ("Human nature does
not change merely because it is found in the jury box. The human mind is not a
slate from which can be wiped out, at the will and instruction of another, ideas and
thoughts written thereon"); Brockman v. State, 60 Okla. Cr. 75, 61 F. (2d) 273
(1936).
6 33 So. (2d) 484 (Ala., 1946).
7 33 So. (2d) 490, 492 (Ala., 1947).
8 People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930). 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed., 1940) §§55, 192.
9 Barber v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 858, 30 S.E. (2d) 565 (1944) ; People v. Cordes,
391 Il1. 47, 62 N.E. (2d) 465 (1945).
10 "The legal objection of unfair surprise, so far as it is ever recognized, is not
founded on the notion that the opponent was not in fact anticipating this specific
evidence but on the notion that he could not have anticipated evidence which might
easily be fabricated; and the objection is recognized as having force only when the
evidence offered is of a class capable of involving the entire range of a person's
life." 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) 206.
11 These exceptions have since 1927 been incorporated in the Michigan Code of
Criminal Procedure, Michigan, 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §17320: "In any criminal case
where the defendant's motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part,
or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing an act, is material, any like acts
or other acts of the defendant which may. tend to show his motive, intent, the absence
of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing
the act in question, may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior
or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show
the commission of another or prior or subsequent crime by the defendant." 1) See also,
Ohio Gen. L. 1929, §13444-19; Louisiana C. Cr. P. 1928, §446.
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1) knowledge, 12 2) the absence of accident, inadvertence or mistake,' 3
3) motive, 14 4) intent.'5 5) design, plan or system,16 and 6) iden-
tity.17 18
In the McKenzie case the testimony of the married woman concerning
the defendant's subsequent assault upon her was permitted to come
in under the intent exception. Under this latter exception evidence
of other offenses is usually allowed for the limited purpose of negativing
the defendant's claim of innocent intent. This exception postulates
the criminal act as proved, i.e., as established by other independent
evidence. Evidence of other offenses may then be brought in to show
that the defendant had the criminal intent normally accompanying his
act. For example, if the defendant in the McKenzie case had grabbed
the prosecutrix by the throat as she was walking down the street at
night and struggled with her until interrupted by a third person, what
he intended to do after he had succeeded in overcoming his victim
would not be clear.' 9 In such a case the act is equally consistent with
an intent to rob, to murder, to rape or to assault. If the defendant in-
sisted that he intended merely to scare the prosecutrix, or to inflict
some injury out of malice, evidence of other rapes or attempted rapes
would have definite probative value. The evidence of similar offenses
would tend to overcome his defense, and to establish a strong probability
that his intent in this instance was the same as on the other occasions.
The trial court would, of course, exercise its discretion in determining
12 Suppose that it is necessary to prove that A knew goods which he received from
B were stolen goods. Evidence that A had twice before been caught in the act of
receiving stolen goods would be admissible to show A's knowledge. 2 Wigmore,
Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) 193.
13 This is Wigmore's classic example. A is hunting with B. A bullet whistles by
B's head, but he attributes it to A's bad aim. A short time later another bullet whis-
tles by even closer. If on the third occasion B is hit in the arm, he will be justified
in inferring that A was aiming at him since the chances are that A would not acci-
dentally come near hitting him three times in the same day. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd
ed., 1940) 198.
14 People v. Harris, 137 Cal. App. 332, 31 P. (2d) 218 (1934) (motive to kill wife
proved by evidence that defendant had performed illegal abortions on the deceased,
that he had illicit relations with a paramour and had conspired with her to kill her
husband).
15 Example cited supra, note 12. Intent is proved indirectly by negativing accident,
mistake or inadvertence. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) 39. For a slightly
different situation involving the intent exception see text, note 19.
16 The classic case illustrating the application of the design exception is People v.
Cosby, 137 Cal. App. 332, 31 P. (2d) 218 (1934). If A had been lured by a news-
paper advertisement to B's apartment and assaulted, evidence of another instance
where he had used the same device would be admissible for the purpose of showing
that A had committed the crime charged, by reference to a common design or scheme.
17 Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928) (peculiar plan "ear-
marked" robberies).
18 For good discussion of these exceptions see (1937) 28 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 917;
(1931) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 473; Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England
(1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 954; Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America (1938),
51 Harv. L. Rev. 988. Mr. Stone after an elaborate historical analysis of the excep-
tions concludes that they should be abolished and other offenses allowed in evidence
whenever they are relevant to the issue before the court, and when the probative
weight of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
19 Wilkins v. State, 29 Ala. App. 349, 197 So. 75 (1940). The majority opinion in
the McKenzie case purported to follow this case. The Wilkins case involved an




how many other offenses could be shown and in what detail,20 as well
as the degree of similarity required,21 and the relation of the other
offenses in point of time.2 2 It would probably require the state to
exhaust all other proof available upon the issue of intent before admit-
ting evidence of other offenses.23 Upon the actual facts of the McKenzie
case, however, the question for the jury was whether the defendant had
attempted to procure sexual relations by consent or by force, since the
crime of assault with intent to commit rape requires the latter type of
extreme conduct.
2 4
The typical example of an assault with intent to commit rape at
common law was the situation where the defendant had satisfied all the
requirements of rape but had failed to effect penetration, or where the
defendant was surprised in the attempt to rape and escaped. 25 In any
event, the crime of assault with intent to rape required an aggravated
assault. In the McKenzie case the majority of the Alabama Supreme
Court assumed that McKenzie's "masher" tactics were so extreme as to
constitute the crime of assault with intent to rape.26 One .of the justices,
in his dissenting opinion, argued that this assumption was unwarranted.
He pointed out that the defendant was not interrupted in his assault
by any external circumstances, nor did the prosecutrix escape from
him. The defendant, he said, had voluntarily desisted from his purpose
in response to the girl's entreaties.27 According to the dissenting opin-
20 When other offenses are allowed in evidence under one of the exceptions it is
important that such proof be limited to relevant details, especially in sex offenses
where the circumstances surrounding the other offense are likely to be charged with
emotional content.
21 .. . some judges... admit such instances as bear a similarity liberally, inter-
Preted by the standard of everyday reasoning. Other judges set their faces firmly
against every instance which is not on all fours with the offense in issue ... " 2 Wig-
more, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) 201.
22 Of course the greater the period of time separating the other offense from the
offense charged, the greater the probability that a repetition can be explained away
as "accident."
23 State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918).
24 Toulet v. State, 100 Ala. 72, 14 So. 403 (1893). Without force, actual or con-
structive, there can be no rape. It must be shown that the prisoner intended to gratify
his passion at all events and notwithstanding the utmost resistance on the part of the
woman. State v. Gilbert, 28 Ala. App. 206, 180 So. 306 (1938). To justify a con-
viction of assault with intent to commit rape the evidence must show such acts and
conduct by the accused as to leave no reasonable doubt of his intention to gratify
his lustful desire against the female's consent and notwithstanding her resistance.
People v. Kruse, 385 Ill. 42, 52 N.E. (2d) 200 (1943).
25 "All of the constituent elements which go to make up the crime of rape, except
penetration, must be alleged in an assault with intent to rape." Edwards v. State,
37 Tex. Cr. 242, 244, 39 S.W. 368, 369 (1897).
26 The Alabama court could have made out the aggravated assault of assault with
intent to rape under these facts if they had assumed that the fifteen year old prose-
cutrix was under the age of consent. In this event, any attempt to have intercourse
would have constituted an attempted rape. However, Alabama has not set an age
below which a child cannot consent, unless such a policy is to be inferred from the
penal provisions of the Alabama code, Ala. Code, Tit. 14, c. 71, 88395, 88398, "Rape
and Kindred Offenses." The death penalty is imposed for rape, and for carnal
knowledge of a girl under the age of twelve. The penalty is imprisonment from two
to fifteen years for carnal knowledge of a -girl between the ages of twelve and
sixteen. The penalty for assault with intent to rape is two to twenty years imprison-
ment. It is probable that the court did not consider the age of the prosecutrix in
finding an aggravated assault.
27 Voluntary abandonment is not always decisive. See People v. Lutes, 179 P.
(2d) 815 (Calif., 1947).
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ion, the conduct necessary to make out an assault with intent to rape
was the same type of forceful conduct required to make out a rape
because the legislature in either instance had prescribed a severe penalty.
The view was also expressed that the majority of the court by per-
mitting the defendant's conviction of an assault with intent to rape
to stand, subjected the defendant to the same punishment attending
forceful assaults in a case where the attempt had been to procure
intercourse by consent. The conclusion of the well-reasoned dissent was
that the court had very little justification for expanding and relaxing
the elements of the crime to take care of a class of cases which the
legislature had not yet recognized as a separate category of criminal act.
The majority of the Alabama court, having assumed that the defend-
ant's acts satisfied the requirementg for the crime of assault with
intent to rape, allowed the state to bring in evidence of other offenses
to prove his intent. Once this assumption is made the intent can be
inferred from the act itself.28 It is noteworthy that in rape cases
intent is seldom if ever in issue. 29 Assuming in the McKenzie case that
the intent to use the utmost force was in issue, it is difficult to see how
the second attack which lacked the same element of force is of any
value in proving the issue in the first assault.30 On the other hand,
it can be argued that the second attack, if it proved anything, tended
to prove that the defendant would not go so far as to use the "utmost
force" to obtain his desire. But an untrained jury of laymen cannot
be expected to discriminate to this extent in its evaluation of the
subsequent offense.
Wigmore in his treatise has indicated that the courts were inclined
to err in favor of the defendants in the application of the exceptions
to the Qharacter Rule.3 ' But courts in recent years have had before
them with increasing frequency cases involving forceful sexual assaults
committed in, or with the use of automobiles.3" The only criminal
categories available to the courts in the absence of legislative action are
the crimes of assault, -assault with intent to rape, and rape. Rape,
because of its stringent requirements, is inapplicable.33 The penalty
for simple assault is hardly proportionate to the seriousness of the
crime. Assault with intent to rape has been the only criminal category
which could be stretched to cover some of the aggravated "masher"
cases. As has been indicated, to achieve this result the courts have
seen fit to relax both the elements required to make out the crime and
28 People v. Mayer, 392 Ill. 257, 64 N.E. (2d) 372 (1945).
29 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) 266.
30 "Proof of similar transactions involving crime must be clearly shown. Mere
suspicion is not enough. The evidence must be such that there can be no room for
speculation in the minds of the jury whether the similar crimes attempted to be
shown were actually committed or not." State v. Cotton, - Ia. ., 33 N.W. (2d)
880 (1948). The second offense in order to be of value in establishing intent would
have to be an actual rape or a proven assault with intent to rape. If the second
offense points only to a general lustful disposition, it is inadmissible because it con-
travenes the character rule. There is an exception to the character rule where the
evidence reflects a "specific emotional propensity." However, under this exception
the prior crime, or prior conduct indicating a lustful nature, must have been directed
specifically toward the prosecutrix. Cf. Note (1947) 25 Tex. L. Rev. 421.
31 2 Wig-more, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) 201.
32 People v. Lutes, 179 P. (2d) 815 (Calif., 1947), Barber v. Commonwealth, 182
Va. 858, 30 S.E. (2d) 565 (1944), People v. Kruse, 358 Ill. 42, 52 N.E. (2d) 200
(1943).
33 Supra note 24.
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